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THE FUTURE OF RESIDUAL CLAUSE INTERPRETATION:
“SHANKING” THE COMMENTARY AND SIMPLIFYING
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT ANALYSIS
AFTER UNITED STATES v. MOBLEY
NICOLAS A. NOVY*
“It will be found an unjust and unwise jealousy to deprive a man of his
natural liberty upon the supposition he may abuse it.”
George Washington1
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2009, Jermaine Mobley sought medical treatment for
his back at a prison infirmary while serving his 151-month prison sentence
for possession with intent to distribute.2  The physical therapist picked up
his right shoe to examine the insole and found a homemade knife, or
“shank,” concealed within.3  Subsequently, Mobley pled guilty to posses-
sion of a prohibited object in prison.4  The sentencing judge enhanced his
sentence, and labeled Mobley a “Career Offender” by concluding that pos-
session of a shank in prison amounted to a “crime of violence.”5  In United
States v. Mobley,6 the Fourth Circuit agreed, and upheld the sentence.7
In the mid-1980s, Congress and the Federal Sentencing Commission
began targeting career criminals due to evidence suggesting a small group
* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Catholic University
of America, B.A. Economics 2011.  I would like to thank all of the editors on
Villanova Law Review for their thorough feedback that made the success of this
Note possible.  This Note is dedicated to my father, Robert Novy, whose
unparalleled work ethic has been a source of inspiration throughout the course of
my studies.
1. Founder’s Quotes, FOUNDERS CORNER, http://founderscorner.us/Founders__
Quotes.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2012).
2. See United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing
background of Mobley’s previous conviction for heroin possession with intent to
distribute).
3. See id. (explaining Mobley’s attempt to hide shank underneath examina-
tion table after physical therapist discovered it).  Shanks are customarily “ ‘made by
inmates from bits and pieces of metal’ and sharpened against concrete.” See id. at
n.1 (citation omitted).
4. See id. at 627 (describing single-count indictment and statutory language).
Mobley was specifically charged with “being an inmate of a prison [and] pos-
sess[ing] . . . a prohibited object.”  18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2006).
5. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 627 (summarizing sentencing judge’s determination
that Mobley’s possession amounted to crime of violence).  For an analysis of the
statutory language, see infra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
6. 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 2012).
7. Id. at 626 (issuing holding affirming sentence).
(337)
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of repeat offenders were responsible for a large number of crimes.8  Con-
gress enacted the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in 1986, which im-
posed minimum sentences on certain felons with multiple prior
convictions for “violent felon[ies] or serious drug offense[s].”9  The Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission followed suit three years later by incorporat-
ing nearly identical language into section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”)—the “Career Of-
fender” provision.10  Under section 4B1.1, an enhanced sentence is im-
posed on repeat offenders who have been convicted of three “crime[s] of
violence or controlled substance offense[s].”11  A crime of violence is de-
fined in pertinent part as, “any offense . . . [that] is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”12  The last
phrase—known as the “residual clause”—is also found in the ACCA defini-
tion of “Violent Felony,” was the focus of the Mobley opinion and has been
the subject of much debate.”13
This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mobley was in-
consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions, was contrary to original
legislative intent, and fails to achieve justice and fairness in sentencing.14
To realize a more universal residual clause framework, courts must focus
on the primary intent behind the legislation: punish violent acts that are
similar in degree and risk to the enumerated offenses in the statute.15
8. See Megan A. Embrey, Comment, A Circuit Split Survey on Violent Felonies and
Crimes of Violence: Where Does the Tenth Circuit Stand?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 469, 469
(2011) (explaining purpose of sentencing enhancement for repeat offenders of
serious crimes).
9. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1); see, e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139–48
(2008) (discussing ACCA and definition of “violent felony” thereunder).
10. See Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal
Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 717–18 (2010) (detailing
history and similarities of ACCA and Section 4B1.1 of Sentencing Guidelines).  For
a discussion of the differences between the ACCA and Section 4B1.1, see infra
notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
11. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2012) (illustrating
which offenses constitute crime of violence).  For a specific discussion of the statu-
tory language, see infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2012) (emphasis added)
(defining terms in Section 4B1.1, including what constitutes crime of violence).
13. See id.; 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (providing relevant portion of ACCA
definition of “Violent Felony”); see also Montgomery, supra note 10, at 718 (explain-
ing that analysis for violent felonies under ACCA and crimes of violence under
Sentencing Guidelines are essentially identical).  For a discussion of the Supreme
Court’s opinions analyzing the residual clause, see infra notes 33–69 and accompa-
nying text.
14. For a discussion of why the Mobley court incorrectly interpreted the
residual clause provision, see infra notes 113–41 and accompanying text.
15. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008) (asserting enumer-
ated offenses, i.e., burglary, arson, etc., limit crimes that may fall within residual
clause because they must be similar “in kind as well as in degree of risk posed to
the examples themselves”); see also United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1277
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Courts should be wary of enhancing an offender’s term based on mere
possession because it is the second unlawful act—the use of a weapon—
that creates a substantial risk to others.16  Equating the two assumes inevi-
tability of the second unlawful act, the use of the weapon, which has not
yet occurred.17
Part II of this Note analyzes the statutory language and the purpose of
both the ACCA and the Career Offender provision under the Sentencing
Guidelines.18  Part III traces the Supreme Court opinions that examine
the residual clause and create the somewhat ambiguous analysis that cir-
cuit courts have labored to apply.19  Part IV analyzes the impact of the
Guideline’s commentary that directs courts to enhance sentencing based
on certain possession offenses.20  Part V explains the facts, procedural
background, and analysis of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mobley.21  Part
VI critiques the holding and reasoning in the Mobley decision as inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent and contrary to congressional in-
tent.22  Part VII considers the implications of the Mobley decision and
offers two suitable alternative solutions that create a more manageable
(11th Cir. 2010) (recognizing Congress included use of explosives as enumerated
violent felony and, therefore, did not intend for mere possession of explosives to
constitute violent felony).  For a further discussion on interpreting the residual
clause provision in conjunction with the enumerated offenses, see infra notes
118–21 and accompanying text, and for a further discussion of Begay, see infra
notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
16. See Serafin v. United States, 562 F.3d 1105, 1115 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding
possession of unregistered weapon did not constitute crime of violence).  “[T]he
use or risk of force is not implicated in [defendant’s] possession of the unregistered
rifle, rather it is the risk he would commit another crime to obtain or retain posses-
sion.” Id.  (explaining risk is recognized when weapon is used, not merely pos-
sessed).  “For example, an individual possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun
might use it against someone . . . . [b]ut at a minimum, this scenario would result
in a charge of aggravated assault or something similar—and that resulting crime
potentially qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’—not the possession itself.” See id. (em-
phasizing danger of weapon is inherent in its use).
17. See United States v. Bradford, 766 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909 (E.D. Wis. 2011)
(holding possession of short-barreled shotgun was not violent felony under
ACCA).  The court explains that mere possession only has a “hypothetical connec-
tion to violence.” See id. (“[S]imple possession merely creates a potential for vio-
lence and aggression that is ordinarily realized only if possession ripens into
use . . . .”).
18. For a discussion of the statutory language and the purpose behind the
ACCA and 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, see infra notes 24–32 and accom-
panying text.
19. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions that analyze the residual
clause, see infra notes 36–78 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the commentary and the impact that it has had on
lower courts, see infra notes 83–95 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mobley, see infra notes
96–112 and accompanying text.
22. For a critique of the decision in Mobley, see infra notes 113–141 and ac-
companying text.
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framework for courts to uniformly interpret residual clause offenses in the
future.23
II. THE BIRTH OF STATUTORY CONFUSION: THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION’S FIRST ATTEMPT TO BROADEN OFFENSES THAT
FALL WITHIN THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE
Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a framework for
increasing base offense levels for “Career Offenders” who have committed
previous “crimes of violence” or “controlled substance offenses.”24  Con-
gress initially intended that the Sentencing Commission use the pre-ex-
isting definition of a crime of violence when determining whether a
defendant should be labeled a Career Offender under the Guidelines.25
This universal definition required the substantial risk of physical injury to
arise during the commission of the offense.26  Nevertheless, a few years later
the Sentencing Commission expanded the Guidelines’ definition of a Ca-
reer Offender in section 4B1.2, despite judicial criticism that the new defi-
nition swept “too broadly.”27
A defendant is labeled a Career Offender under section 4B1.1 if the
defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense,
the instant offense is a crime of violence or substance abuse offense, and
the defendant has at least two prior convictions for crimes of violence or
23. For a discussion of suitable solutions that would provide a workable frame-
work for lower courts to analyze residual clause offenses in the future, see infra
notes 142–72 and accompanying text.
24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2012) (defining “Ca-
reer Offender”); see also id. § 2K2.1(a)(1) (providing that “Career Offenders” as
defined by section 4B1.1 shall receive heightened base offense levels).
25. See Amy Baron-Evans et al., Deconstructing the Career Offender Guideline, 2
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 39, 59 (2010) (stating that congressional intent was to have
universal definition of “crime of violence,” however, Sentencing Commission did
not comply and amended new definition anyway).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006) (defining universal crime of violence residual
clause as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a sub-
stantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense”); see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 304
(1983) (illustrating Congress’s intent that section 16 “define[ ] the term ‘crime of
violence,’ used here and elsewhere in the bill”).  The general definition of “crime
of violence” found in section 16 and the ACCA’s definition in Section 994(h) were
both enacted as part of the Comprehensive Control Act of 1984. See Baron-Evans
et al., supra note 25, at 59 n.38 (explaining that both definitions stemmed from
same act); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 203 n.12 (1993) (“It is
axiomatic that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended
to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States,
286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))).
27. See Baron-Evans et al., supra note 25, at 59 (illustrating Commission’s re-
luctance to state any reason for changing definition of crime of violence despite
judicial animosity).
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substance abuse offenses.28  In pertinent part, section 4B1.2 defines a
“crime of violence” as an offense that “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”29  The requirement that
the substantial risk of physical injury must arise during the commission of the
offense is conspicuously absent; thus the Sentencing Commission effec-
tively expanded the scope of the residual clause beyond Congress’s
intent.30
The language in the ACCA that provides a similar sentencing en-
hancement for offenders with three prior convictions of a “violent felony”
is virtually identical to the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of a “crime of
violence.”31  Therefore, courts have considered analyses under the ACCA
28. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2012) (defining “Ca-
reer Offender”).  According to the Guidelines, a “controlled substance offense” is
defined as:
[A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-
port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counter-
feit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, dis-
tribute, or dispense.
Id. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added) (defining controlled substance offense).  Posses-
sion of a controlled substance, alone, is not sufficient; intent to distribute, or some
other form of intent to dispense the substance is also necessary. See id.
29. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2012) (emphasis ad-
ded) (defining “crime of violence”).
30. See Baron-Evans et al., supra note 25, at 59 (describing Commission’s ac-
knowledgment that its new definition “reached offenses not traditionally consid-
ered crimes of violence”).
31. See Montgomery, supra note 10, at 718 (acknowledging Supreme Court
decisions are wide-reaching because of virtually identical language in both stat-
utes).  Nevertheless, the ACCA mandates sentencing enhancement when the in-
stant offense is unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and the defendant has
three prior convictions of “violent felonies.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (illus-
trating examples of sentencing enhancement).  In contrast, the Sentencing Guide-
lines imposes sentencing enhancement when an offender has committed a “crime
of violence” and has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crimes of
violence or controlled substance offense.” See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 4B1.1 (2012) (describing requirements for “Career Offender” sentencing
enhancement).  This distinction, however, does not change the analysis of either
residual clause and is therefore outside the scope of this Note.  The ACCA defines
a violent felony as follows:
(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency
involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that
would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an
adult, that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or oth-
erwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physi-
cal injury to another . . .
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residual clause and the Sentencing Guidelines residual clause to be
interchangeable.32
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S ATTEMPT TO NARROW THE PLAYING FIELD:
CONFUSING BUT IMPLICITLY SOUND
Despite the Sentencing Commission’s best efforts to sweep in uncon-
ventional crimes of violence to enhance sentencing more frequently, the
“Supreme Court stepped in [and] narrowly interpret[ed] the statutory
definitions of ‘crime of violence’ and ‘violent felon[ies]’” as amended by
the Commission.33  However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
residual clause has resulted in a circuit split and incompatible interpreta-
tions applied by various district courts.34  When analyzing whether a cer-
tain offense falls within the residual clause and constitutes a crime of
violence or a violent felony, courts consider: (1) what information is appli-
cable, and (2) whether the crime falls within the residual clause.35
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  The residual provision in the Sentencing Guidelines
only differs slightly by using the phrase “burglary of a dwelling” whereas the ACCA
refers to general “burglary.” Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(a) (2012) (requiring “burglary of a dwelling”), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (indicating standard “burglary” is sufficient to classify “violent fel-
ony”).  For the purpose of this Note, however, the distinction is irrelevant.
32. See United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining
courts analyzing offenses under ACCA’s residual clause provision are guided by
cases interpreting Section 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause and vice versa, due to nearly
identical language in both clauses); see also United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141,
1145 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The residual clause of the ACCA is worded almost identi-
cally to that of § 4B1.2(a), and we have held that in interpreting ‘crime of vio-
lence’ under § 4B1.2, we may look for guidance to cases construing the ACCA’s
parallel provision.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3020 (2011); United States v. Tyler, 580
F.3d 722, 724 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Although the Gordon court was analyzing
whether an offense constituted a ‘violent felony’ under the Armed Career Crimi-
nal Act, we employ the same test to decide whether an offense constitutes a ‘crime
of violence’ under the Sentencing Guidelines because the definitions of ‘violent
felony’ and ‘crime of violence’ are virtually identical.” (citing United States v. Wil-
son, 562 F.3d 965, 967–68 (8th Cir. 2009))).  Despite the language being virtually
identical, some commentators have suggested that “the ACCA’s definition of ‘vio-
lent felony’ should be amended to be consistent with the Guidelines definition of
‘crime of violence’” in order to avoid any further inconsistencies or prejudice. See
James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 567 (2009) (advocating
for one completely uniform definition).
33. Baron-Evans et al., supra note 25, at 59 (explaining that Supreme Court
attempted to help resolve issue by narrowly interpreting residual clause language
in both ACCA and Sentencing Guidelines).
34. See Montgomery, supra note 10, at 719 (suggesting Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of residual clause is so irreconcilable that Congress should amend
ACCA).
35. See David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual
Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209, 217 (2010) (explain-
ing issues courts consider when determining whether offense falls within residual
clause).
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A. The Categorical Approach: Established in Taylor and refined in James
In Taylor v. United States,36 the Supreme Court established that courts
may only consider whether the “generic” offense constituted a crime of
violence and are restrained from considering the facts in any particular
case.37  When evaluating an offense as a potential crime of violence, courts
must use a “categorical approach that relies only on the state statute’s ele-
ments and the fact that there was a conviction under that statute.”38  The
court adopted the categorical approach because the “practical difficulties
and potential unfairness of a factual approach [were] daunting.”39  Only
in a narrow range of cases, where the state’s statute is broader than the
definition of the generic offense, can the specific facts of the defendant’s
offense be considered.40
Taylor’s categorical approach was slightly modified in James v. United
States.41  The Supreme Court found that attempted burglary constituted a
violent felony under the residual clause despite lacking the statutory ele-
36. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
37. See id. at 602 (establishing courts must only consider elements of offense
and not underlying facts of defendant’s specific crime).
38. Brett T. Runyon, Comment, ACCA Residual Clause: Strike Four?  The Court’s
Missed Opportunity to Create a Workable Residual Clause Violent Felony Test [Sykes v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011)], 51 WASHBURN L.J. 447, 453 (2012) (discuss-
ing necessity and logistics of categorical approach).  The court in Taylor held that a
conviction for burglary, under Florida’s statute, was sufficient to support a violent
felony conviction under the generic burglary statute of the ACCA. See Taylor, 495
U.S. at 602 (establishing categorical approach).
39. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (describing inherent difficulties in speculating
whether defendant’s specific conduct constituted crime of violence); see also Isham
M. Reavis, Comment, Driving Dangerously: Vehicle Flight and the Armed Career Criminal
Act After Sykes v. United States, 87 WASH. L. REV. 281, 330 (2012) (explaining
“ACCA levies too harsh a penalty to be applied with anything less than the caution
demanded by the categorical approach”).  Namely, in some cases “only the Gov-
ernment’s actual proof at trial would indicate whether the defendant’s conduct
constituted generic burglary.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (explaining possibility Gov-
ernment would have to present testimony of witnesses again before sentencing
court).  The court also noted that nothing in the statute indicates that Congress
intended sentencing courts to engage in “elaborate fact finding” when considering
the defendant’s prior offenses. See id. (stating lack of congressional history and
plain meaning of statute supports categorical approach).
40. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (considering state statute allowing convictions
of burglary for entry of automobile and entry of building).  If a state statute in-
cludes breaking and entering of an automobile sufficient to support a burglary
conviction, factual evidence of defendant’s crime can be introduced at sentencing
to show whether the statutory requirements for generic burglary were met. See id.
(explaining that convictions of burglary under certain state statutes may not rise to
conviction of “generic” burglary).  Thus, only when a state statute requires the
same or narrower elements to support a conviction for burglary can the Govern-
ment use that conviction to support a sentencing enhancement. See id. (describing
situations where government can use conviction under state law to support sen-
tencing enhancement under Career Offender provision of Sentencing
Guidelines).
41. 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (modifying categorical approach founded in Taylor).
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ments of a generic, completed burglary.42  Although attempted burglary is
not a completed crime, a violent felony under the residual clause need
only involve conduct that “presents at least as much risk as one of the
enumerated offenses.”43 The court reasoned that attempted burglary, in
the ordinary case, involves inevitable face-to-face confrontation that
presents just as much, if not more, potential risk to others than a com-
pleted burglary.44  Although James narrowed the statutory element re-
quirement expressed in Taylor, the Court also recognized the danger in a
fact-specific analysis and concluded the “proper inquiry is whether the
conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case,
presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.”45
B. Narrowing the Lens of the Residual Clause: The Court Rules on
DUI Offenses
Larry Begay was convicted of three driving under the influence
(“DUI”) felonies under New Mexico law, but the Supreme Court refused
to categorize his offenses as violent crimes under the residual clause in
Begay v. United States.46  The Court reasoned that the presence of the enu-
merated offenses (burglary, arson, etc.) indicated the statute was only in-
tended to cover “similar crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’”47  The enumerated
examples limit the reach of the residual clause because the clause may
only cover crimes that are “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of
42. See id. at 214 (holding Taylor’s categorical approach is still applicable).
Although the Court undercuts Taylor’s precedent to some extent, the Court in
James recognized they “avoided any inquiry into the underlying facts of James’ par-
ticular offense, and have looked solely to the elements of attempted burglary as
defined by Florida law.” See id. (implementing Taylor’s categorical approach).
43. See id. at 210–11 (recognizing that although some attempted burglaries
are non-violent, attempted burglaries in ordinary case and completed burglaries
present equivalent risk to others); see also Holman, supra note 35, at 220 (“A hypo-
thetically peaceful commission of the crime should not exclude it from the
residual clause.”).
44. See James, 550 U.S. at 204 (concluding that risk posed by attempted bur-
glary is comparable to risk posed by completed offense).
45. See id. at 208 (emphasis added) (reasoning Court’s approach simplifies
residual clause analysis). But see Holman, supra note 35, at 220–21 (explaining that
James approach supplies lower courts with insufficient guidance).  Holman criti-
cizes James because sentencing courts have “few tools” to consistently determine
whether conduct, in the ordinary case, is sufficiently risky. See id. (lamenting that
sentencing courts only have their “intuitive belief” and rough statists at their
disposal).
46. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).  New Mexico law makes DUI a felony after the fourth
subsequent offense, and defendant Begay had been arrested for DUI twelve times.
See id. at 140 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102G-J (West 2007) (noting Begay’s
twelfth DUI marked his third violent crime according to sentencing court).
47. Id. at 142 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)) (explaining enu-
merated offenses would be superfluous had Congress meant for clause to include
all crimes that present serious potential risks of physical injury).
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risk posed, to the examples themselves.”48  Specifically, the enumerated
offenses all “typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’
conduct.”49
In Begay, the Court recognized that although a defendant who drives
while intoxicated poses a significant potential risk of physical injury to
others, the offense does not involve the purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct that is characteristic of the examples enumerated in the statute.50
48. Id. at 143 (explaining courts must give effect to every clause and word
when interpreting statutes); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (advo-
cating that every word in statute must be given effect whenever possible); Duncan
v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (discussing clauses in statutes must be read
together in order to be correctly interpreted).  The court also noted the word
“otherwise” did not expand the scope of the clause because “otherwise” means
offenses may differ in the “‘way or manner’” they produce certain risks. See Begay,
553 U.S. at 144 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1598
(1961)).
49. Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964,
980 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted), reversed
and remanded, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (1985)
(describing “arson” as causing fire or explosion “with the purpose of . . . destroying
or damaging any property”).  The Court also recognizes this purposeful, violent,
and aggressive conduct is the type of conduct that makes a perpetrator who later
possesses a gun more likely to “use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.” See
Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (explaining such violent, aggressive, purposeful crimes are
characteristic offenses of armed career criminal or career offender). But see
Holman, supra note 35, at 229–31 (noting “likely shooter” analysis has no contex-
tual roots in statute or legislative history).  The “likely shooter” analysis stems from
the ACCA’s requirement that the defendant be charged with the instant offense of
felon-in-possession of a firearm after being previously convicted of three “violent
felonies.” See id. at 229 (asserting analysis was created for sole purpose to avoid
unjust results such as finding DUI offenses as violent felonies).  The analysis also
directly conflicts with the categorical approach announced in Taylor/James. See id.
at 230 (explaining likely shooter analysis “casts a wider net” than categorical ap-
proach because in considering whether offender would likely commit deliberate,
harmful, crime against another, courts are considering defendant’s previous con-
duct and not solely whether instant offense creates substantial risk of physical in-
jury to another in ordinary case).  For a discussion of the categorical approach, see
supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.  Although Begay introduces the “likely
shooter” analysis in a case interpreting the ACCA, because the offender was in
possession of a gun, the analysis can still be helpful when determining whether a
defendant committed a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines be-
cause the analysis is predominantly based on targeting a certain “type” of violent
career offender. See Cynthia R. Cook, Comment, The Armed Career Criminal Act
Amendment: A Federal Sentence Enhancement Provision, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99,
114 (1989) (noting ACCA and USSG both target “the individual who has been
deemed a threat to society”).
50. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (reasoning DUI felonies are more similar to strict
liability crimes, rather than those offenses enumerated in statute that involve vio-
lent, aggressive, and purposeful behavior).  Although a DUI offender may “drink on
purpose . . . .  [T]he conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted . . . need not
be purposeful or deliberate.” Id. at 145; see also United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d
964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining even though DUI offenses “undoubtedly
entail[ ] risk of physical injury to others, drunk driving is a crime of negligence or
recklessness, rather than violence or aggression”), rev’d and remanded, 553 U.S. 137
(2008).  Although a DUI offense reveals “a degree of callousness towards risk,” it
9
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The Court made clear that the offenses may only fall within the scope of
the residual clause if the conduct is similar in nature and degree of risk
posed to the enumerated offenses in the statute.51
C. Passive Crimes Fall Outside the Residual Clause
The Supreme Court reiterated its Begay analysis a year later in Cham-
bers v. United States,52 and held that failing to report to a penal institution
for weekend confinement did not constitute a violent felony under the
residual clause of the ACCA.53  The Court properly recognized that failing
to report is a form of inaction and “a far cry” from the conduct “poten-
tially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits
arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of ex-
tortion.”54  Although the offender who fails to report is doing “something at
the relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the something poses a
serious potential risk of physical injury.”55  The Court supported its rea-
soning by introducing statistics that demonstrated that violence does not
typically occur “during [the] commission of the offense itself.”56
does not, unlike the enumerated offenses, indicate an increased likelihood that
the offender is “the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull
the trigger.” Begay, 553 U.S. at 146 (categorizing type of person targeted by stat-
ute).  The Court concluded that driving under the influence “is simply too unlike
the provision’s listed examples for us to believe that Congress intended the provi-
sion to cover it.” See id. at 142 (implying Congress did not intend to cover offenses
that were not actively deliberate).
51. See Embrey, supra note 8, at 480 (noting that “Begay test requires not only
that the offense present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, but it
must also be ‘roughly similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed’ to the enu-
merated offenses” (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 143–45)).  The author states “[a]
crime is ‘roughly similar’ to an enumerated offense if it ‘typically involve[s] pur-
poseful, “violent,” and “aggressive” conduct.’” Id. (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at
143–45) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
52. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
53. See id. at 123–24 (recounting defendant’s sentence required him to report
to prison for eleven weekends of incarceration, and he failed to report on four
separate occasions).
54. Id. at 128 (comparing failing to report to penal institution with use of
explosives, burglary, and arson).  Without defining the terms “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive,” the Court recognized that passive, non-active offenses are too dis-
parate from the characteristics of the enumerated offenses exemplified in the stat-
ute. See id. (same).
55. Id. (implying courts cannot assume defendant would inevitably commit
future crime during weekend he failed to report).  Furthermore, the contrary as-
sumption seems more likely because an individual “who fails to report would seem
unlikely, not likely, to call attention to his whereabouts by simultaneously engaging
in additional violent and unlawful conduct.” See id. (explaining rationale for
holding).
56. See id. at 129 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON FEDERAL ESCAPE
OFFENSES IN FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007 6 (2008)) (acknowledging that of 160
failure to report cases, “none at all involved violence” during commission of of-
fense).  The Court, for the first time, demonstrated an offense cannot be catego-
rized as a crime of violence or a violent felony if physical injury results in only one
10
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D. Slight Retreat from Begay Causes Confusion for Lower Courts
The Supreme Court’s most recent attempt to provide lower courts
with a clear residual clause framework was predominantly unsuccessful in
Sykes v. United States.57  The Court held that knowingly and intentionally
fleeing law enforcement in a vehicle was a violent felony under the ACCA
and required sentencing enhancement.58  When an offender intentionally
defies law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle, a “lack of concern for the
safety of property and persons . . . [is] an inherent part of the offense.”59
This intentional disregard for the safety of others is fundamentally why
vehicle flight presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.60
In coming to its conclusion, the Court analogized vehicle flight to the
crime of burglary, noting that the danger in burglary is that it “can end in
confrontation leading to violence.”61  Unlike burglary, however, vehicle
flights occur in the presence and in defiance of police orders, causing a
substantial risk of collisions and injuries to persons and property.62  In
support of its conclusion, the Court introduced statistics to illustrate that
vehicle flights result in physical injury to innocent third parties twenty per-
cent more often than burglaries, and held that vehicle flight is signifi-
out of every thousand attempts. See id. at 130 (concluding that failure to report for
penal confinement is not violent felony); see also Runyon, supra note 38, at 458
(asserting Chambers “set the floor for the level of risk that is insufficient to qualify
under the residual clause”).
57. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). See Runyon, supra note 38, at 463 (explaining Sykes
missed an opportunity to provide lower courts with workable residual clause frame-
work that could be consistently applied).  Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Sykes, pro-
vided that “[i]nsanity, it has been said, is doing the same thing over and over
again, but expecting different results.  Four times is enough.” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at
2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining Court has failed, yet again, to provide suffi-
cient guidance to interpret ambiguous residual clause).
58. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2270 (noting vehicular flight was defendant’s third
violent felony and required sentencing enhancement).
59. Id. at 2273 (explaining defendant creates possibility that police will “ex-
ceed or almost match his speed or use force to bring him within their custody”).
In the instant case, defendant “wove through traffic, drove on the wrong side of
the road and through yards containing bystanders, passed through a fence, and
struck the rear of a house.  Then he fled on foot.  He was found only with the aid
of a police dog.” Id. at 2272.
60. See id. at 2273 (acknowledging dangers inherent in vehicle flight have “vi-
olent—even lethal—potential for [risk of physical injury to] others”).
61. Id. (explaining that burglary is enumerated statutory violent felony that
presents similar risks to innocent third parties).  The Court notes the danger in
face-to-face confrontation is of a “greater degree” in vehicle flight because it is the
“expected result . . . [and] places property and persons at serious risk of injury.”
See id. at 2273–74 (anticipating almost inevitable necessity for police to “approach
with guns drawn to effect arrest” once vehicle chase ceases).
62. See id. at 2274 (implying vehicle flight has higher degree of risk than enu-
merated offense—burglary).
11
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cantly more risky than the “‘closest analog among the enumerated
offenses.’”63
The holding in Sykes is consistent with past residual clause precedent,
but the Court went out of its way to suggest offenses no longer need to be
classified as “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” in order to be character-
ized as a crime of violence.64  The Court explained that Begay involved a
strict liability offense—driving under the influence—and the “purposeful,
violent, and aggressive” analysis was only meant to explain that result.65
The Sykes Court suggested that the Begay analysis was only applicable to
strict liability offenses that do not require purposeful conduct.66
Thus, the Court attempted to narrow the analysis and focus primarily
on whether the offense at bar is “similar in risk” to the enumerated of-
fenses.67  Despite slightly undermining the Begay/Chambers rationale, the
Court recognized the intentional, active, and destructive nature of vehicu-
lar flight and noted that the Begay analysis is “an addition to the statutory
text” and “[i]n many cases . . . will be redundant . . . .”68  As Justice Scalia
63. Id. at 2273 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007))
(holding vehicular flight was violent felony because it created significantly more
risk of physical injury to others than risk presented by similar enumerated of-
fense). See Runyon, supra note 38, at 459–60 (citing Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274) (com-
paring statistics resulting in physical injury during burglaries with statistics
resulting in physical injury during vehicle flights).  Of 7,737 police pursuits, 313
injuries to police and bystanders occurred, a rate of more than 4 injuries to non-
suspects per 100 pursuits. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274.  Of the average 3.7 million
annual burglaries, 118,000 resulted in physical injuries to innocent third parties,
or 3.2 injuries for every 100 burglaries each year. See id.
64. See id. at 2275 (indicating Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test
should be limited).
65. See id. at 2275–76 (“The phrase ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ has
no precise textual link to the residual clause.”).  For a discussion of why this test/
phrase in Begay could not have been intended for solely reckless, or non-pur-
poseful crimes, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining scope of
Begay’s purposeful, violent, and aggressive analysis).  Although the Court alleges
Begay was intended solely for non-purposeful offenses, Justice Scalia correctly notes
that such an interpretation “makes no sense.” See id. at 2285  (reasoning that if
Begay test was to apply to only unintentional crimes, “it would be recast as the
‘purposeful’ test, since the last two adjectives (‘violent, and aggressive’) would do
no work”).
67. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (noting that comparing
risk level of offense at bar to enumerated offense provides manageable approach
when considering intentionally committed offenses).  Nevertheless, the Court goes
on to state that this approach “suffices to resolve the case before us.” See id. (em-
phasis added) (implying it is not only approach courts may use, and suggesting
approach is not dispositive).
68. See id. at 2275 (describing nature of felony vehicular flight).  The opinion
certainly articulated the nature of the conduct at issue, describing felony vehicular
flight as “entail[ing] intentional release of a destructive force dangerous to others”
and consisting of a “provocative and dangerous act.” See id. at 2273–75 (asserting
Begay test will not be necessary or dispositive analysis in most cases because “crimes
that fall within the [Begay] formulation and those that present serious potential
risks of physical injury to others tend to be one and the same”). But see id. at 2285
12
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added in his dissent, the Begay test “has been neither overlooked nor re-
nounced in today’s tutti-frutti opinion.”69
The Supreme Court’s slightly inconsistent analyses have created a
spectrum that courts must consider when determining whether an offense
falls within the residual clause.70  On the left of the spectrum is the pur-
poseful, violent, and aggressive standard proclaimed in Begay, which also
requires the crime to be “similar in kind” to the enumerated offenses.71
On the right of the spectrum, the only consideration is whether a crime
poses substantial risk of physical injury to others and whether the risk
posed by the present offense is comparable to the “closest analog” of the
enumerated offenses.72 Chambers successfully balanced these two compet-
ing ideologies by considering the comparative nature of the offense as well
as the comparative risk to others during its commission.73  The Court’s
decision in Sykes, however, leaned right and emphasized the risk posed by
vehicular flight comparatively to the enumerated offenses.74  Nevertheless,
the opinion implicitly considered the comparative nature of the offense,
leaving lower courts and scholars inconsistently applying Chambers and
Sykes.75
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That seems to be the case here—though why, and when it
will not be the case, are not entirely clear.”).
69. See id. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging Court failed to clar-
ify impact of Begay analysis going forward).
70. For a discussion of the spectrum that the Supreme Court has created with
regard to the residual clause analysis, see infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of Begay and the Court’s analysis, see supra notes 46–51
and accompanying text.
72. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2271, 2273, 2275 (“In general, levels of risk divide
crimes that qualify from those that do not.”).  Not within the spectrum is Justice
Thomas’s suggested analysis catalogued in his Begay dissent as well as his Sykes con-
currence: “[t]he only question” is whether conduct in an ordinary case “‘presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2278
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)) (advocat-
ing courts should essentially ignore enumerated offenses, and as long as offense
presents serious potential risk to another, it should fall within scope of residual
clause); see also United States v. Begay, 553 U.S. 137, 156 (2008) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) (same).  This approach is inconsistent with principles of statutory interpreta-
tion because had Congress intended that all offenses possessing a risk of injury to
others be included they would not have enumerated the offenses of burglary, ar-
son, and use of explosives as guidance; these words would be superfluous. See
Begay, 553 U.S. at 142 (acknowledging enumerated offenses were meant to limit
reach of residual clause).  Justice Thomas’s suggested interpretation is off to the
far right of the spectrum and is not further discussed because it does not comply
with principles of statutory interpretation and ignores congressional intent. See id.
(same).
73. For a discussion of Chambers and the Court’s analysis, see supra notes
52–56 and accompanying text.
74. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2276 (asserting that if offense is “similar in risk” to
enumerated offenses it presents sufficient potential risk to others to classify it as
crime of violence).
75. See United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that “no [Supreme Court] case overrule[d] a prede-
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Lower courts that have chosen to read Sykes broadly have improperly
disregarded the enumerated offenses’ primary characteristic—conduct
that is aggressive, violent, and intentional.76  The test outlined in Begay was
meant to direct courts to focus on the nature of the offense as well as the
degree of risk posed.77  The Sykes court, however, may have opened the
door once again—as it was pre-Begay—to crimes that are “wholly diver-
gent” from the crimes enumerated in the statute.78
cessor” and more importantly all four cases considered the “concern first identi-
fied in Begay—namely that violent felonies must both ‘present[ ] a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another’ and be ‘similar, in kind as well as in
degree of risk posed, to the examples’ set out in the statute” (quoting Begay, 553
U.S. at 141, 143 (last alteration in original) (emphasis added))).  For a discussion
of the Court’s implicit reliance on Begay by recognizing the violent, aggressive na-
ture of vehicular flight, see supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2011)
(holding that possession of knife in prison is violent felony under residual clause).
Courts such as Perez-Jiminez overlooked the enumerated offenses when attempting
to follow Sykes. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273 (explaining enumerated offenses “pro-
vide guidance” in determining whether offenses present serious potential risk of
physical injury to another).  The following hypothetical demonstrates the problem
inherent in failing to consider the nature of the enumerated offenses:
[I]magine that the residual clause requires the ACCA’s sentencing en-
hancement to be applied to red hippopotamuses because the color red is
associated with conduct that poses a substantial risk of physical injury to
others.  Moreover, this requirement is immediately preceded in the same
subsection by a clause listing four blue hippos with red spots, named
Bergman, Arnold, Edmund, and Urban.  Bergman, Arnold, Edmund,
and Urban are blue because the color blue is associated with crimes typi-
cally committed by intentional and aggressive conduct toward property.
Intentional and aggressive conduct toward property also typically creates
a risk of physical injury to others as well; thus, the four named hippos
have red spots.
This hypothetical violent felony provision would read: the “sentenc-
ing enhancement shall apply to Bergman, Arnold, Edmund, or Urban, or
otherwise to red hippopotamuses.”  The Court’s current residual clause
analysis focuses on the named hippos’ red spots—symbolizing the risk of
physical injury to others—which is their secondary and more unusual
characteristic.  But, being blue—symbolizing intentionally aggressive acts
toward others’ property—is the named hippos’ primary and readily iden-
tifiable characteristic.  The Court’s use of the secondary characteristic to
connect the residual clause to the enumerated felonies frustrates the sen-
sible guidance the enumerated felonies could provide for the residual
clause.  It would be more reasonable to interpret the statute so that the
residual clause only encompasses other blue hippos with red spots, rather
than hippos of any color with a splotch or two of red.
Runyon, supra note 38.  The current state of residual clause analysis is both flawed
and confusing to apply because courts are focusing on the offense’s secondary
characteristic, the potential of injury to others, rather than focusing on the nature
of the offense itself. See id.
77. For a discussion of the Court’s analysis in Begay, see supra notes 46–51 and
accompanying text.
78. See Runyon, supra note 38, at 466 (explaining courts, since Sykes, have con-
sidered offenses that were properly disposed of in Chambers and Begay).  The Elev-
enth Circuit, in a decision preceding Begay, upheld a lower court’s holding that
carrying a concealed weapon was a violent felony. See United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d
14
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IV. THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AMENDS THE COMMENTARY AND
OVERLY EXPANDS SCOPE OF RESIDUAL CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving mere possession
of a prohibited weapon or a case involving an offender carrying a con-
cealed weapon.79  As a result, lower courts have struggled to achieve con-
sistency in light of vague congressional drafting and “tutti-frutti” Supreme
Court precedent.80  The closest established precedent seems to be Cham-
bers, which dealt with a passive, non-active, and non-violent offense.81  Nev-
ertheless, some recent circuit court decisions have relied more heavily on
Sykes, ignored Chambers, and limited the scope of Begay beyond the Court’s
intent due in large part to the Sentencing Commission’s confusing direc-
tive in its commentary.82
On November 1, 2004, the Sentencing Commission amended the
commentary of the Sentencing Guidelines to expressly provide that
“[u]nlawfully possessing a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (e.g., a
sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun) is a
‘crime of violence.’”83  Since the amendment, courts analyzing the statu-
398, 401–02 (11th Cir. 1996) (relying on Begay to reach conclusion that mere pos-
session of concealed weapon was not sufficient to enhance sentencing), abrogated
by United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).  Prior to Begay,
other dissimilar offenses were categorized as crimes of violence, and now also seem
to meet the right-leaning, narrow criteria advocated in Sykes. See, e.g., United States
v. Eastin, 445 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding incest was residual
clause violent felony); United States v. Brown, 273 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding pandering to be residual clause violent felony).
79. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 628 (recognizing most relevant Supreme Court
decisions as Sykes, Chambers, and Begay).  For a complete discussion of relevant Su-
preme Court case law, see supra notes 36–69 and accompanying text.
80. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining lower
courts’ failure to interpret Supreme Court precedent is ultimately Supreme
Court’s fault); see also Montgomery, supra note 10, at 736 (advocating Supreme
Court should hold statute invalid for vagueness, forcing Congress to amend it in
more definite terms); Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
Supreme Court precedent has produced “four[ ] ad hoc judgment[s] that . . . sow
further confusion”).
81. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (holding failure to
report to penal institution was “far cry” from purposeful, aggressive, and violent
conduct that statute was meant to target).  For a full discussion of Chambers, see
supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of lower courts applying Supreme Court precedent to
offenses of mere possession, see infra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
83. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 674 (2011)
(describing possession offenses that amount to crimes of violence in commentary).
Section 5845 of the United States Code subjects specific weapons to regulation or
prohibition and defines “firearms” as:
(1) [A] shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in
length; (2) a weapon made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified
has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less
than 18 inches in length; (3) a rifle having a barrel or barrels of less than
16 inches in length; (4) a weapon made from a rifle if such weapon as
modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels
15
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tory language of the Sentencing Guidelines have been bound to classify
possession of such firearms as crimes of violence in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Stinson v. United States.84 Stinson held that the com-
mentary interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines is authoritative “unless it
violates the Constitution . . . or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline.”85  Although the Guidelines as a whole are only
advisory after United States v. Booker,86 they still remain highly influential
when determining the sentencing range for a particular conviction.87
Many courts have also relied on the Sentencing Guidelines’ commen-
tary to interpret the language in the ACCA—notwithstanding that the
of less than 16 inches in length; (5) any other weapon, as defined in
subsection (e); (6) a machinegun; (7) any silencer (as defined in section
921 of Title 18, United States Code); and (8) a destructive device. The
term “firearm” shall not include an antique firearm or any device (other
than a machinegun or destructive device) which, although designed as a
weapon, the Secretary finds by reason of the date of its manufacture,
value, design, and other characteristics is primarily a collector’s item and
is not likely to be used as a weapon.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (2006).  Nevertheless, the amended commentary only directly
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, not the ACCA because no provision or com-
mentary in the ACCA mandates that certain possession offenses receive enhanced
sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006) (illustrating what constitutes “vio-
lent felony” in ACCA).  As previously discussed, however, the statutory analysis is
virtually identical due to the reciprocal language in the statutes.  For a discussion
of courts treating the analyses as identical, see supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
84. 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (holding commentary that defines Guidelines more
precisely is “authoritative”).
85. See id. at 38 (directing courts to consider commentary enacted by Sentenc-
ing Commission as authoritative unless it is “inconsistent” with statutory
interpretation).
86. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not
mandatory, when considering proper sentencing range).  A sentencing court is
required to “consider [the] Guidelines ranges, but permitt[ed]. . .to tailor the sen-
tence in light of other statutory concerns.” Id. at 222 (internal citation omitted).
87. Id. (acknowledging Guidelines remain highly influential); see also United
States v. Schwartz, 408 Fed.Appx. 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that although
courts must still apply definitions that are proscribed in Guideline’s commentary
under Stinson, this does not mean that sentencing range resulting from that calcu-
lation is mandatory).  Pre-Booker, courts were bound by the definitions set forth in
the commentary and by the range such Guidelines imposed; thus, the commentary
essentially had the full force and effect of the Guidelines’ themselves, which al-
lowed the Sentencing Commission the power to “make law without the participa-
tion of Congress.” See Ira Bloom, The Aftermath of Mistretta: The Demonstrated
Incompatibility of the United States Sentencing Commission and Separation of Powers Princi-
ples, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (1996) (explaining amended commentary now has
same effect as “statutorily prescribed” method after Stinson); see also Joseph W.
Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”: A Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1204 (1999) (suggesting
Sentencing Commission should be subject to greater transparency and judicial
review).
16
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commentary is not directly applicable to the ACCA.88  For example, the
Fifth Circuit held that possession of a pipe bomb constituted a crime of
violence because by its nature, possessing a pipe bomb creates a substan-
tial risk of physical injury.89  The court reasoned that there is no lawful or
legitimate purpose for possession of a pipe bomb such as use for sport or
self-defense.90  Ultimately, these courts have concluded that the inherent
danger associated with the character of the weapon implied that posses-
sion would inevitably result in use and violence.91
Courts analyzing the ACCA that have opted not to follow the com-
mentary have recognized that mere possession of a “firearm” under Sec-
tion 5845(a) lacks the overt, violent conduct contemplated by the
enumerated offenses.92  Even when considering the comparative risk of
firearm possession with the risk posed by the enumerated offenses (the
test emphasized in Sykes), “[c]ommon-sense tells us that possession of a dan-
gerous item does not pose the same or similar degree of risk as the use of
88. See, e.g., United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (ex-
plaining possession of short shotgun is “roughly similar to the listed offenses within
the ACCA”); United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing possession of sawed-off shotgun was sufficient to constitute crime of violence
because commentary was applicable).
89. See United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1999) (focusing
on nature of weapon, not circumstances surrounding possession); cf. Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611–12 (1994) (explaining that possession of Section
5845(a) “firearms” presents significant risk of physical injury to others because of
their “quasi-suspect character”).
90. See Jennings, 195 F.3d at 798 (explaining that unlike handguns, pipe
bombs have no recreational, legitimate uses such as hunting or “engag[ing] in
target practice”).  The court also recognized that self-defense, a legitimate and law-
ful purpose for possessing a weapon, would be “quite difficult” and wholly unrealis-
tic with a pipe bomb. See id. (explaining possession of pipe bombs have “no
peaceful purpose”); cf. United States v. Drapeau, 188 F.3d 987, 990 n.4 (8th Cir.
1999) (discussing inherent dangerousness of pipe bomb itself); United States v.
Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing pipe bombs have no
legitimate purpose and have potential to “kill indiscriminately, without warning,
and with less chance that the perpetrator will be caught”).
91. See Jennings, 195 F.3d at 799 (reasoning possession of inherently danger-
ous pipe bomb will “inevitably . . . result in violence”).  Courts have suggested that
mere possession of these weapons is sufficient to trigger sentencing enhancement
under the residual clause because of the weapon’s violent nature, without consider-
ing whether the weapon was ever used or intended to be used. See United States v.
Golding, 332 F.3d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding machine guns are “firearms”
as defined in Section 5845, possession of which constitutes crime of violence).  The
court added that such firearms are “‘highly dangerous offensive weapons’ that are
regulated ‘in the interest of public safety.’” See id. (quoting United States v. Freed,
401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)).
92. See, e.g., United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010)
(holding possession of short-barreled gun is not violent felony because it is not
“‘similar in kind’” to enumerated offenses (quoting Begay v. United States, 553
U.S. 137, 143 (2008))); United States v. Haste, 292 Fed. App’x 249, 250 (4th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (holding possession of “weapon of mass destruction” is not
violent felony under ACCA).
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that item.”93  Concluding otherwise confuses offenses that may, by their
nature, enable violence or the threat of violence with offenses that actually
involve violent and aggressive conduct.94  The residual clause was only in-
tended to target the latter, thus, the commentary has been more of a
source of confusion rather than one of clarity.95
V. POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED WEAPONS IN PRISON: UNITED STATES
V. MOBLEY
On July 13, 2012, the Fourth Circuit issued a decision declaring that
passive possession of a homemade knife in prison constituted a “crime of
violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. Mobley.96
The court relied heavily on similar federal circuit opinions and analogized
the possession of a knife to the possession of a weapon of mass destruc-
tion, such as a bomb, machine gun, or explosive.97  Despite the Supreme
Court dispelling non-active crimes a “far cry” from the types of offenses
the Guidelines intended to cover, Mobley adds to the confusion surround-
ing residual clause interpretation by considering the circumstances sur-
rounding the weapons possession rather than the nature of the weapon
itself.98
A. Facts and Procedural Background
Jermaine Mobley was an inmate at a Federal Correctional Institution
near Raleigh, North Carolina, and was serving a 151-month sentence for
possession with intent to distribute.99  On September 14, 2009, Mobley
sought medical treatment at the prison infirmary, complaining of soreness
93. United States v. Bradford, 766 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (ex-
plaining ACCA targets potential risk associated with use of dangerous weapons,
not merely possession of them). See McGill, 618 F.3d at 1279 (realizing that target-
ing possession of weapons is beyond scope of residual clause).  Such an interpreta-
tion would effectively read the word “use” out of the statute. See id. (implicating
each word in statute).
94. See United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 830 (8th Cir. 2009) (Gruender,
J., dissenting) (concluding that possession of dangerous weapon may enable vio-
lence, but offense of possessing prohibited weapon does not involve violent
conduct).
95. See James G. Levine, supra note 32, at 545 (acknowledging that Congress’s
intent was to keep society safer by targeting those relatively small number of habit-
ual offenders that were “responsible for a large fraction of crimes”).
96. 687 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2012).  For a discussion of the background and the
holding in Mobley, see infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of the reasoning employed in Mobley, see infra notes
108–12 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the ramifications of the Mobley decision, see infra notes
113–41 and accompanying text.
99. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626 (explaining background of prior sentence for
possession with intent to distribute heroin).
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and numbness in his feet.100  The physical therapist picked up Mobley’s
right shoe to examine its insole and found a concealed shank inside.101
Mobley immediately attempted to hide the knife under the examination
table, but the prison staff soon recovered it.102
Mobley pled guilty to possession of a prohibited object in prison
under Title 18 of the United States Code.103  Under Title 18, a “prohib-
ited object” is defined as “an object that is designed or intended to be used
as a weapon or to facilitate escape from a prison.”104  Subsequently,
Mobley was labeled a “Career Offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines
because he had two prior felony convictions for controlled substance of-
fenses, and the district court found that Mobley’s instant offense consti-
tuted a “crime of violence.”105  Although Mobley objected to this
designation, the district court overruled his objection and found “there is
no passive possession of a weapon in a prison setting.”106  Mobley ap-
pealed the court’s designation as a “Career Offender” to the Fourth Cir-
100. See id. (describing Mobley’s condition that prompted him to seek medi-
cal treatment).
101. See id. at 626 n.1 (citation omitted) (explaining shanks are homemade
knives made from bits and pieces of metal and sharpened against concrete).
102. See id. at 626 (describing passive nature of Mobley’s possession).
Mobley’s active attempt to hide the knife from the prison guards is evidence that
he was not attempting to use or threaten to use the knife in any respect. See
United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining defen-
dant’s attempt to hide weapon from officers who were approaching indicates that
he “in no way attempted to use the weapon to prevent his arrest”).
103. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626 (describing Mobley’s guilty plea); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1791(a)(2) (2006) (detailing offense of inmate in possession of prohibited ob-
ject in prison).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(B) (2006).  Nevertheless, the definition of a
“prohibited object” is broad, and also encompasses objects such as controlled sub-
stances, currency, and telephones. See id. § 1791(d)(1) (defining “prohibited
object”).
105. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 627 (discussing how Mobley’s base level offense
for instant crime rose four levels because court ruled that instant offense was crime
of violence, subjecting Mobley to “Career Offender” sentencing enhancement).
Mobley’s sentencing range would have been an additional twenty-four to thirty-
seven months had the “Career Offender” sentencing enhancement not been ap-
plied; instead, the sentencing range increased to thirty-seven to forty-six months
for his instant offense. See id. (explaining factual background).  Under Section
4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a convicted defendant is a career offender if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defen-
dant committed the instant offense of conviction;
(2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense; and
(3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (2012).  For a further discussion
of Section 4B1.1 and the statutory language, see supra notes 28–29 and accompany-
ing text.
106. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 627 (holding possession of homemade knife in prison
was crime of violence).
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cuit, asserting that mere possession of a shank in prison does not
constitute a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.107
B. The Majority’s Reasoning
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by briefly considering the Su-
preme Court opinions in Begay and Sykes, and merely citing Chambers with-
out explaining its precedent.108  Subsequently, the court declined to
follow a factually-similar Third Circuit’s case, which held that possession of
a knife in prison did not constitute a crime of violence.109  Relying almost
exclusively on decisions in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the court
found that “ ‘[t]here is no legitimate purpose’” for possessing a knife in
prison, and therefore, such possession is “similar in kind to the offense of
possessing a [sawed-off shotgun] outside of prison[,]” which is recognized
as a crime of violence under the commentary of section 4B1.2.110  The
court determined the offense was “similar in kind and degree of risk posed
to the enumerated offenses” and consisted of “ ‘purposeful, violent, and
107. See id.
108. See id. at 628 (dedicating small paragraph to explaining prior Supreme
Court precedent on residual clause analysis).  Ultimately, the court briefly ex-
plained that Sykes “focused on the question of whether the offense of intentional
vehicular flight was comparable in degree of risk to the enumerated offenses.” See
id. (citing Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011)).
109. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 629–30 (citing United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515,
519 (3d Cir. 2009)) (asserting mere possession does not rise to level of violent and
aggressive conduct). Polk recognized that the enumerated offenses all involve
“overt, active conduct that results in harm to a person or property” and mere pos-
session of a prohibited object in prison does not. Polk, 577 F.3d at 519.  The Mobley
court gave little reasoning for why it rejected Polk in favor of “[t]hree other of our
sister circuits . . . [that] have addressed the same issue and reached a different
conclusion.” Mobley, 687 F.3d at 629–30 (justifying result by relying on other cir-
cuit court opinions).
110. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631 (quoting United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d
1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2011)) (analogizing possession of weapon in prison with
possession of prohibited “firearms” in Section 5845(a) because “both of these
crimes prohibit the possession of dangerous weapons in contexts where they have
no lawful purpose”).  The court relied on three alternative circuit court opinions
that concluded possession of a prohibited object in prison constituted a crime of
violence. See Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1143 (reasoning “‘confines of prison pre-
clude any recreational uses for a deadly weapon . . . . [and] [t]he only reason to
carry such a weapon is to use it to attack another or to deter an attack’” (quoting
United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1341–43 (10th Cir. 1997)); United States
v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 711–12 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that possession of weap-
ons in prison is “similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed” to enumerated
offenses and involved “violent and aggressive” conduct); United States v. Marquez,
626 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting possession of weapons in prison inevita-
bly results in face-to-face confrontation, much like burglary).  Nevertheless, the
Mobley court admitted that the Tenth Circuit decision in Perez-Jiminez was the only
decision that was on “all fours” with the case at issue besides the Third Circuit’s
decision in Polk, which was rejected. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 630 (agreeing with
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning).
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aggressive’” conduct.111  Thus, mere possession of a prohibited weapon in
prison “‘present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’”
and was subject to Career Offender sentencing enhancement.112
VI. THE RAW END OF THE SHANK
The Mobley court’s determination that passive possession of a home-
made knife in prison constituted a crime of violence is difficult to jus-
tify.113  The court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines’
commentary and misapplication of Supreme Court precedent improperly
enhanced Mobley’s sentence beyond the statute’s intent.114  It is impera-
tive that future courts “hesitate[ ] to greatly expand the list of offenses . . .
to any offense that creates a public risk.”115
A. Mobley Misapplied Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court decisions interpreting the residual clause have
been difficult for district courts and circuit courts to consistently apply,
and Mobley is no exception.116 Mobley correctly considered the Begay test
but incorrectly applied it by reasoning that possession of a knife in a
prison constituted a purposeful, violent, and aggressive offense.117 Mobley
failed to recognize that the Supreme Court decision in Chambers had al-
ready determined that crimes of inaction are a “far cry” from the pur-
poseful, violent, and aggressive conduct inherent in the enumerated
111. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 630–31 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
145 (2008)) (reasoning possession of weapons in prison “obviously facilitates vio-
lence” and therefore, such conduct is similar in kind as well as degree to the enu-
merated offenses).
112. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631–32 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 4B1.2 (2012)) (concluding possession of homemade knife in prison consti-
tuted crime of violence). But see id. at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Polk that there is fundamental difference between active, violent, aggressive con-
duct exemplified by enumerated offenses and “‘the passive crime[ ]’ of mere pos-
session” (alteration in original) (quoting Polk, 577 F.3d at 519)).
113. For a discussion of why the Mobley court’s reasoning is difficult to justify,
see infra notes 131–41 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of how the court did not correctly apply Supreme Court
precedent, see infra notes 115–26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
court’s misplaced reliance on the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, see
infra notes 128–41 and accompanying text.
115. United States v. Flores, No. 00-81122, 2005 WL 3088348, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 17, 2005) (explaining that possession offenses do not come with the
“same type or degree of serious potential risk as burglary and arson”), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 477 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2007).
116. For a discussion of the inconsistencies inherent in the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the residual clause, see supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text.
117. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 630–31 (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
144–45 (2008)) (applying Begay analysis).  For a discussion of why the Begay test is
still appropriate in light of Sykes, see supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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offenses.118  Mere possession of a prohibited object cannot be “similar in
kind” to the enumerated offenses because it does not involve affirmative,
active, and violent behavior—the primary characteristics of the enumer-
ated offenses.119  Even if the Mobley court analyzed the offense through
the narrower Sykes approach, possession does not pose a “similar degree of
risk” because mere possession of a weapon cannot possibly pose the same
risk as the use of that weapon.120  The use of explosives subjects the of-
fense to sentencing enhancement, and suggesting that possessing explo-
sives or similarly dangerous weapons suffices completely “read[s] the word
‘use’ out of the . . . statute.”121
Moreover, when a penal statute is ambiguous, courts are “obliged to
apply the rule of lenity and resolve the conflict in the defendant’s
favor.”122  The rule of lenity requires “ambiguity concerning the ambit of
118. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128 (2009) (holding failure
to report to penal institution and passive crimes do not constitute crimes of vio-
lence); United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009) (reasoning that
although possessing prohibited objects is purposeful, the “‘act of possession does
not, without more . . . , involve any aggressive or violent behavior’” (quoting
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008))).
119. See, e.g., Polk, 577 F.3d at 519 (holding possession of weapon in prison
was not similar in kind to enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, or use
of explosives).  For a discussion of the enumerated offenses primary characteristic,
see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
120. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 142 (articulating that statute covers only “similar
crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006))).  Dangers inher-
ent in possessing a weapon only comes to fruition when the weapon is used. See
Serafin v. United States, 562 F.3d 1105, 1115 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he use or risk
of force is not implicated in [defendant’s] possession of the unregistered rifle,
rather it is the risk [the defendant] would commit another crime to obtain or
retain possession.”).
121. United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining
reluctance to classify possession of dangerous weapon offense as violent felony
when statute “speaks only to the use of another”); see also United States v. Flores,
477 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that statute enumerates use of
dangerous weapons rises to level of violent felony but possession does not). But see
United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding possession of
short shotgun presents same type of danger involved in use of explosives).
122. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 194 (4th Cir. 2010) (establishing
when rule of lenity should be applied); see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S.
507, 515 (2008) (explaining court should not “play the part of a mindreader” and
apply rule of lenity in favor of defendants when faced with ambiguous criminal
statutory language); Mobley, 687 F.3d at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (stressing court’s
obligation to apply rule of lenity); United States v. Cutler, 36 F.3d 406, 408 (4th
Cir. 1994) (explaining rule of lenity is applicable in the context of Sentencing
Guidelines).  The rule of lenity is a “necessary safety valve” to protect defendant’s
due process rights and was properly revitalized in the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Santos.  Note, Rule of Lenity, 122 HARV. L. REV. 475, 475–76 (2008)
(illustrating importance of Santos decision and application of rule of lenity); see also
Definition of “Violent Felony”, 121 HARV. L. REV. 345, 346 (2007) (criticizing Supreme
Court’s decision in James because it failed to give enough deference to rule of
lenity).
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criminal statutes [to] be resolved in favor of lenity.”123  At the very least,
the Career Offender provision and the residual clause in particular are
ambiguous, as demonstrated by the plethora of inconsistencies in their
application.124 Mobley failed to address the rule of lenity and ignored the
“fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain.”125  The court also
made no effort to support its conclusion with the introduction of statistical
data, an analytical tool that was recently endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Chambers and Sykes.126  By failing to apply the rule of lenity, misinter-
preting the Court’s decisions in Begay, and ignoring the rationale in Cham-
123. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (explaining rule of len-
ity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning before enhancing of-
fenders’ sentences). See 29A OHIO JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Substantive Principles and
Offenses § 75 (2012) (stating that rule of lenity “provides that a court will not inter-
pret a criminal statute so as to increase the penalty it imposes on a defendant if the
intended scope of the statute is ambiguous”).
124. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (insisting residual clause is so ambiguous it amounts to “a drafting failure”
and Supreme Court should “declare it void for vagueness”); see also Mobley, 687
F.3d at 636 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (explaining due to residual clause’s “ambiguity
and the confusion experienced, and created, by the courts, inmates lack sufficient
notice that simple possession of a shank constitutes a crime of violence”); Mont-
gomery, supra note 10, at 739 (advocating Congress should amend residual provi-
sion due to constant inconsistencies in application).  The dissenting opinion in
Mobley further acknowledges that “varying judicial interpretation” among the cir-
cuits is evidence that the residual clause fails to provide “sufficient notice to the
public.” See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 636 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (discussing why rule of
lenity must be applied in Mobley).
125. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514 (finding correct application of rule of lenity also
“places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak
more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress’s stead”); see
Reavis, supra note 39, at 330 (explaining that “ACCA levies too harsh a penalty to
be applied with anything less than the caution demanded by the categorical
approach”).
126. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274–75 (supporting opinion through statistical
data); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128–30 (2009) (same). But see
Holman, supra note 35, at 251 (arguing that even if statistics are used accurately,
“chosen metric for the ‘ordinary case’ shifts from judge to judge”); cf. Jin Woo Oh,
Note, United States v. Chambers: Noncustodial Escapes Do Not Always Constitute a
Violent Crime for Purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y SIDEBAR 363, 373 (2009) (explaining that it may not be realistic or possible
for studies to be done on every offense, and requiring such “might stymie the
sentencing enhancement process and hurt the ACCA’s fundamental purpose of
getting violent, recidivist criminals off the street”).  The result has been a plethora
of inconsistent lower court opinions that hinge on arbitrary, statistical lines that
vary depending on the presiding judge. See Holman, supra note 35, at 253 (ex-
plaining “[g]oalposts move, depending on the court or the judge”).  The Seventh
Circuit held that “a two percent incidence of violence during the commission of
[an offense]” was a “‘sufficient risk of injury’” to trigger sentencing enhancement.
Id. at 253–54 (quoting United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir.
2008)) (explaining even at low frequencies offense still possesses “serious” risk of
physical injury to others).  Nevertheless, the problem with relying on a statistical
analysis is that it does not provide other courts with a workable framework in deter-
mining whether an offense is legally violent. See id. at 254 (criticizing Templeton,
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bers, the Mobley decision effectively added to the confusion surrounding
residual clause case law and unjustly classified Mobley’s offense as a crime
of violence.127
B. A Misplaced Reliance on the Commentary: Transforming a Knife into a
Machine Gun
The Mobley decision attempted to buttress its reasoning by equating
possession of a knife in prison with possession of an inherently dangerous
weapon as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), which includes sawed-off shot-
guns, bombs, and machine guns.128  Courts have recognized that these
weapons, by their nature, all have the capability of killing indiscriminately
and “lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes.”129  Use for
sport or self-defense could not conceivably be the primary purpose for
possessing any of the listed weapons in Section 5845(a); thus, the com-
mentary directs courts to categorize possession of these weapons as crimes
of violence.130
and acknowledging that if two percent incidence of violence is sufficient, then
“perhaps any likelihood greater than zero will qualify the crime as legally violent”).
Statistics also do not provide offenders with additional notice as to what con-
duct is violent enough to trigger sentencing enhancement. See id. (explaining lack
of uniformity in application of statistics results in inconsistent and arbitrary sen-
tencing enhancement, unbeknownst to offenders).  The concurring opinion in
Chambers, written by Justice Alito and Justice Thomas, emphasized that the use of
statistics was just another way that the Court has led “us further and further away
from the statutory text.” See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 134 (Alito, J., concurring) (en-
couraging Congress to amend ACCA’s residual clause because of constant inconsis-
tencies in application).
127. For a discussion of why the court’s holding unjustly enhanced Mobley’s
sentence, see supra notes 128–41 and infra notes 127–40 and accompanying text.
128. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631 (asserting that “offense of possessing a shank
in prison is similar in kind to the offense of possessing a Section 5845(a) weapon
outside of prison”).
129. United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 825–26 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Unites States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 2005)) (describing violent na-
ture of sawed-off shotguns); see also United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798
(5th Cir. 1999) (finding no “non-violent or lawful uses for a pipe bomb”).  Courts’
analyses have also suggested that because of the violent nature of weapons de-
scribed in Section 5845(a), there is a “virtual inevitability that such possession will
result in violence.” Id. at 799; see also United States v. Golding, 332 F.3d 838, 843
(5th Cir. 2003) (explaining nature of weapon suggests it lacks lawful or legitimate
uses). But see Mobley, 687 F.3d at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (reasoning that even
acts that are “categorically unlawful” are not transformed into “‘dangerous and
provocative act[s]’ that [themselves] endanger[ ] others” (citing Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at
2273)).  The dissent in Mobley further recognized the failure to report for confine-
ment in Chambers “cannot be accomplished in any lawful manner; but the Supreme
Court nevertheless declared it to be non-violent.” Id. (citing Chambers, 555 U.S. at
128).
130. See Jennings, 195 F.3d at 798 (recognizing that it would be “quite difficult
to protect oneself or one’s family with a pipe bomb”).  Weapons categorized as
“firearms” under Section 5845(a) are “primarily weapons of war and have no ap-
propriate sporting use or use for personal protection.” Id. at 799 n.4 (citation
omitted). But see Baron-Evans, supra note 25, at 62 (recognizing exception to pos-
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A makeshift knife constructed from bits and shards, however, could
be possessed primarily for self-defense and may be the least violent means
of protecting oneself in a prison setting.131  The constitutional right to
self-defense is not “diminished by one’s imprisonment.”132  Rather, the
right should be afforded greater protection considering inmates are
stripped of “virtually every means of self-protection[,]” including “access
to outside aid.”133  To assume Mobley’s possession was predatory by nature
ignores prison’s “state of nature” atmosphere, where the “‘strong will ex-
ploit the weak, and the weak are dreadfully aware of it.’”134
Furthermore, the court improperly expanded Begay because the test
was only meant to apply to offenses “similar in kind” to the statutory of-
session of Section 5845(a) firearms if weapon is “a collector’s item”).  For a further
discussion of the impact of the Sentencing Guideline’s commentary, see supra
notes 79–95 and accompanying text.
131. See James E. Robertson, “Fight or F. . . “ and Constitutional Liberty: An In-
mate’s Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REV. 339, 339 (1995)
(acknowledging “staff cannot or will not protect [inmates] from rape, assault, and
other forms of victimization”).  Although it is possible to use a sawed-off shotgun
or machine gun in self-defense, it undoubtedly would not be the least violent
weapon or means to achieve that goal. See United States v. Golding, 332 F.3d 838,
842 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining machine guns are “‘highly dangerous offensive
weapons’” (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971))).  Further,
Mobley attempted to hide the shank when the physical therapist discovered it in
his shoe, and nothing in the case indicates that Mobley was ever charged with use
of the weapon while incarcerated. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626–27 (describing
Mobley’s passive possession of knife); see also United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d
439, 442 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that possession of concealed weapon with
nothing more did not present “serious potential risk of physical injury to
another”).
132. Robertson, supra note 131, at 358 (alleging contemporary “Hobbesian
prison” makes self-defense “more worthy of constitutional protection” in prison
setting than “the exercise of self-defense in civil society”).
133. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (describing prison guards’
duty to attempt to keep inmates safe).  “In the outside world, a person who is
verbally or physically harassed can call the police or seek legal assistance to deter
the harasser.  In prison, there is no one to call.  Consequently, there is little choice
but to engage in self-help in the settling of disputes.” MATTHEW SILBERMAN, A
WORLD OF VIOLENCE: CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 75 (1995).
134. Robertson, supra note 131, at 358–59 (quoting PAUL W. KEVE, PRISON
LIFE AND HUMAN WORTH 54 (1974)) (describing prison atmosphere).  The weak
have little recourse for self-defense or protection because “vulnerable inmates can-
not run from predators” and inmates must sometimes arm themselves to avoid
victimization. Id. at 361; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (as-
serting that “[i]nmates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and
conform their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal im-
pulses of self-restraint”); Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.
2005) (illustrating that prisons present unique problems because they are “‘neces-
sarily dangerous places [because] they house society’s most . . . violent people in
close proximity with one another’” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Thomas. J.,
concurring))).
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fenses such as burglary and arson.135  It was not meant to apply to offenses
that are “similar in kind” to the offenses enumerated by the commentary,
among which are possession of a machine gun or a bomb.136  Nothing in
the commentary suggests that the circumstances surrounding the weapons’
possession are relevant in determining its inclusion.137  Rather, the com-
mentary recognized that possession of some weapons, based on their of-
fensive and violent nature, are dangerous enough to constitute a crime of
violence, such as the “weapons of war” listed in Section 5845(a).138  Not
surprisingly, a homemade knife is not among them.139  Although possess-
ing a knife in some circumstances outside of prison may create a potential
risk of physical injury to others, the existence of such circumstances does
not transform a homemade knife into a dangerous weapon capable of
mass destruction.140  The Mobley decision not only improperly assumed
that the possession of the shank was not for self-defense purposes, but also
135. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008) (explaining that
offenses only fall within residual clause if they are “roughly similar, in kind as well
as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves”).
136. See id. at 142 (explaining that “the provision’s listed examples—burglary,
arson, extortion, or crimes involving use of explosives—illustrate the kinds of
crimes that fall within the statute’s scope”).  The Mobley court improperly equated
offenses the commentary had ruled were crimes of violence—possession of sawed-
off shotguns, machine guns, etc.—with offenses that the statute enumerated as
crimes of violence, i.e., burglary, arson, or use of explosives. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at
631 (using Begay’s “similar in kind” rationale to compare homemade knives to
other weapons, such as sawed-off shotguns).  Nevertheless, the Begay test was only
meant to apply to the enumerated, statutorily defined offenses. See Begay, 553 U.S.
at 143 (explaining that offenses only fall within residual clause if they are “roughly
similar, in kind as well in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves”).
137. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. 1 (2012) (assert-
ing that possession of any weapon listed under Section 5845(a), i.e., a sawed-off
shotgun, machine gun, etc., constitutes crime of violence).  For a discussion of why
possession of Section 5845(a) weapons constitutes a crime of violence under the
commentary, see supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
138. See United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 799 n.4 (5th Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussing Congress’s expansion of scope of National Firearms Act to include weap-
ons such as bazookas, sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and bombs, which have
no lawful purpose and are “weapons of war”).
139. For a discussion of the full list of the enumerated weapons that consti-
tute a violent “firearm” under Section 5845(a), see supra note 83.
140. See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (explain-
ing that almost “any object—a car, a golf club, even a pair of nail clipper—can be
used to cause physical injury”); United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 442 (7th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that “possession of any weapon—brass knuckles, black
jacks, knives [or] chains” increase risk of physical injury to others, but possessing
them is not necessarily crime of violence); State v. McKnight, 19 P.3d 64, 65 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2000) (illustrating offense where defendant beat victim with golf club
until he bled profusely).  Virtually any object can be used to cause physical injury;
thus, courts must determine whether the object, by its nature, presents a “ ‘serious
potential risk’ of physical injury.” See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047 (citation omitted)
(describing focus of courts).  For a discussion of when possessing a knife or a gun
outside of prison may pose a serious potential risk of physical injury to others but
would still not be considered a crime of violence, see infra notes 167–69 and ac-
companying text.
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improperly analogized a shank to a dangerous “firearm” by considering
the circumstances surrounding the possession rather than the nature of
the weapon itself.141
VII. GETTING BACK ON TRACK: CORRECTLY INTERPRETING SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT AND ACHIEVING LEGISLATIVE INTENT CONSISTENTLY
Courts in all jurisdictions have struggled to find the appropriate scope
of the residual clause due to inconsistent commentary, which is incompati-
ble with current Supreme Court precedent.142  The following two solu-
tions suggest ways to create a workable residual clause framework for
future courts that encourages consistency.143  The first is to amend the
commentary so that it is consistent with current Supreme Court prece-
dent.144  The second solution is to judicially limit the reach of possession
offenses to those explicitly enumerated as dangerous firearms in Section
5845(a).145
A. Amending the Commentary to Achieve Consistency with Supreme
Court Precedent
Greater consistency in residual clause interpretation can be achieved
by amending the commentary to dictate that possession, without more,
cannot be classified as a crime of violence that justifies sentencing en-
hancement.146  Generally, it is well catalogued that possession does not
amount to a crime of violence unless it is coupled with an overt act indicat-
ing or implying use.147  The Seventh Circuit has recognized that
141. See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 332 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 2003) (fo-
cusing on dangerous nature of machine gun).  According to the commentary, dan-
gerous “firearms” under Section 5845(a) constitute a crime of violence, however,
Section 5845(a) does not include any type of residual provision suggesting that
ordinary weapons may fall into the “firearm” category depending on circumstances
surrounding their possession. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (2006) (explicitly enumerat-
ing what weapons qualify as dangerous “firearms”).  The analysis in Begay was not
meant to broaden the scope of the commentary, but rather to identify which types
of offenses the statutes’ residual clause provisions intended to target. See Begay,
553 U.S. at 142–43 (explaining that offenses similar in kind to statutorily defined
enumerated offenses are also crimes of violence because residual clause provision
exists).
142. For a discussion of why the commentary is inconsistent with the statutory
language, see infra notes 146–62 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of the first proposed solution, see infra notes 146–62
and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the second proposed solution, see
infra notes 162–71 and accompanying text.
144. For a full discussion of the first proposed solution, see infra notes 146–62
and accompanying text.
145. For a full discussion of the second proposed solution, see infra notes
163–72 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of why mere possession of any weapon should not
amount to a crime of violence, see infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
147. See United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that possession of gun in waistband of pants is not crime of violence without overt
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“[d]espite the obvious dangers of convicted felons possessing firearms, it is
quite a stretch to contend that simple possession alone constitutes a crime
of violence.”148  Several other circuits have applied similar logic, recogniz-
ing that burglary, arson, and use of explosives are illustrative examples
that involve “affirmative and active conduct that is not inherent in the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon.”149  Moreover, the “statute pro-
vides that the use—rather than the possession—of explosives is conduct
act of attempting to use gun); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding possession of gun and firing it is crime of violence), superseded by
statute on other grounds, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 433 (2003),
as recognized in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); United States v.
Thompson, 891 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding possessing gun and point-
ing it at someone was crime of violence).  Simple possession does not “fit easily”
within the literal definition of the statute because it lists “specific examples—bur-
glary, arson, extortion, use of explosives—and then adds, ‘or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” See
United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)) (acknowledging specific statutory language requires ac-
tive conduct).  Although the statute criminalizes possession of a “controlled sub-
stance,” sentencing enhancement is not applicable unless the possession is
coupled with “intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2012) (describing situations that require
sentencing enhancement when defendant possesses controlled substances).  For a
full definition of a controlled substance offense, see supra note 28.
148. United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 918–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (“There is
a wide expanse of possibilities that fall between firing a gun and merely possessing
one.  Some of these involve a substantial threat of force; others do not.”), superseded
by statute on other grounds, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 433 (2003),
as recognized in Stinson v. United States 508 U.S. 36 (2011).  Thus, the possession of
Mobley’s knife outside of prison would not constitute a crime of violence, as it
would be analogous to the possession of an unregistered firearm, except less dan-
gerous. See United States v. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 1990) (explain-
ing that although “carrying an illegal weapon may involve a continuing risk to
others, the harm is not so immediate as to ‘present[ ] a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2) (B)(ii) (2006)). But see Jeffrey C. Bright, Violent Felonies Under the
Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act: Whether Carrying a Concealed Handgun
Without a Permit Should Be Considered a Violent Felony, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 601, 636
(2010) (arguing importance of categorizing possession offenses by felons as crimes
of violence because carrier is probably “a person with poor judgment”).
149. United States v. Flores, 477 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining
difference between mere possession offenses and violent, active, characteristics of
enumerated offenses); see also United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2008) (holding that carrying concealed firearm was not crime of violence).
The Archer court relied on the Begay analysis for support. See id. at 1350 (explain-
ing presence of enumerated examples “indicates that the statute covers only similar
crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another’” (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008))).
Had Congress intended mere possession be subject to sentencing enhancement, as
well as all other possible crimes that present a serious potential risk of physical
injury, it is “hard to see why it would have needed to include the examples at all.”
Begay, 553 U.S. at 142 (emphasizing importance of giving meaning to every word in
statute).  More importantly, to read the statute broadly in order to cover posses-
sion offenses “would also bring within the statute’s scope a host of crimes that do
not seem to belong there.” See Doe, 960 F.2d at 225 (explaining that “[t]o include
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that rises to the level of a violent felony.”150  Thus, “the risk of force,” in
cases dealing with mere possession, “is at least one step removed from the
underlying crime.”151
The commentary has expanded the scope of the statute beyond its
original purpose and it is at odds with several Supreme Court decisions
requiring offenses to be similar in kind and degree of risk posed to the
enumerated offenses.152  Only a few courts have reasoned that mere pos-
session of a dangerous weapon and use of that same weapon pose identical
risks to others.153  Doing so assumes inevitability of use, and courts have
understandably been reluctant to enhance a defendant’s sentence based
on the possibility of future criminal action.154  The commentary, however,
possession, one would have to focus upon the risk of direct future harm that pre-
sent conduct poses”).
150. Flores, 477 F.3d at 436 (explaining if Congress had intended possession
of explosives to be sufficient, they would not have required their use).
151. United States v. Serafin, 562 F.3d 1105, 1115 (10th Cir. 2009) (reasoning
use of weapon would result in separate offense that could, potentially, be catego-
rized as crime of violence; however, mere possession of that weapon is not what
creates substantial risk of physical injury).
152. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011) (asserting offense
must pose similar degree of risk as enumerated offenses); Begay, 553 U.S. at 143
(explaining enumerated offenses were meant to limit offenses that fall under
residual clause because they must be similar to enumerated offences); see also Le-
vine, supra note 32, at 545 (describing purpose of Career Offender sentencing
enhancement was to make society safer by incarcerating repeat offenders for
longer periods of time).  The dissent in Mobley recognizes, “nothing indicates that
prisoners who possess shanks are career offenders engaged in violent crimes, as
opposed to, e.g., ordinary inmates in jail on non-violent drug charges with a crude
weapon made for self-defense purposes only.”  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d
625, 635 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting) (explaining disagreement with ma-
jority opinion).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (rea-
soning that possession of short shotgun poses same risk as use of explosives). But
see United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining it
would be improper to “classify possessing one type of [unlawful] weapon as a violent
felony when the ACCA speaks only to the use of another.  To do so would read the
word ‘use’ out of the ACCA statute”); Serafin, 562 F.3d at 1115 (expressing danger
of unlawful possession is “inherent to its use, not merely in its possession”); United
States v. Bradford, 766 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“Common-sense tells
us that possession of a dangerous item does not pose the same or similar degree of
risk as use of that item.”).
154. See Serafin, 562 F.3d at 1115 (acknowledging that “[i]t can hardly be said”
individuals possessing unlawful weapons will inevitably use them against others);
United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 418 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[The enumerated]
offenses each manifest affirmative, overt and active conduct in which the danger
posed to others extends beyond the mere possession of a weapon, and is far more
threatening in an immediate sense.”); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 919
(7th Cir. 1990) (“There is a wide expanse of possibilities that fall between firing a
gun and merely possessing one.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 433 (2003), as recognized in Stinson v. United
States 508 U.S. 36 (2011); Bradford, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 908 (suggesting that equat-
ing possession with use “confuses the risk of injury that may result from the offense
conduct with the violent/aggressive nature of the conduct itself”).
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forces courts’ hands when defining the terms enumerated in Guidelines,
and has a similar effect in cases analyzing the ACCA because the two analy-
ses have historically been identical.155
Case law interpreting the residual clause was still developing when the
commentary was amended to include possession of dangerous firearms in
2004.156  Since the adaptation of the commentary, the Supreme Court has
dispelled passive, non-active crimes as a “far cry” from the enumerated
offenses.157  Additionally, the Court has required offenses be “similar in
kind” and possess an equivalent degree of risk as the enumerated of-
fenses.158  Courts have applied the standard consistently for carrying con-
cealed weapon offenses but have struggled with respect to dangerous
“firearms” under Section 5845(a) due in large part to the commentary’s
confusing directive.159
Simplifying residual clause case law begins with applying Supreme
Court precedent and dispelling the commentary as inconsistent with the
Guidelines’ statutory language in light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions.160  The commentary must be amended so that it only subjects a de-
fendant to sentencing enhancement when possession of a weapon is
155. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (holding commentary
interpreting sentencing guidelines “is authoritative unless it violates the Constitu-
tion or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of,
that guideline”).  For a discussion of the similar authority and analysis of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines and the ACCA, see supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court precedent, see supra
notes 36–78 and accompanying text.
157. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128 (2009) (holding defen-
dant’s failure to report to penal institution was too dissimilar to enumerated of-
fenses that all exhibit active and violent characteristics).  For a full discussion of
the Chambers rationale, see supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
158. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2276 (2011) (emphasizing
offense must pose similar or equal risk to closest analog enumerated offense);
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008) (explaining enumerated exam-
ples limit crimes that fall within residual clause).  For a full discussion of Sykes, see
supra notes 57–69 and accompanying text.  For a full discussion of Begay, see supra
notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
159. Compare supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text (discussing courts
application of precedent with regards to possession of handguns and carrying con-
cealed weapons), with supra notes 88–95 (discussing courts application of prece-
dent with regard to possessing firearms under Section 5845(a)).
160. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 (holding commentary interpreting sentencing
guidelines “is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute,
or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline”).  Never-
theless, “commentary that is broader than the guideline it interprets is invalid.”
Baron-Evans, supra note 25, at 88 (“If it were otherwise, the Commission could
change the meaning of a guideline through commentary, which Congress does not
review.”).  If the commentary for a sentencing enhancement “does not reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law or provide just punishment
for the offense” the commentary must not be applied.  United States v. Handy, 570
F. Supp. 2d 437, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding two-level strict liability sentencing
enhancement invalid).  Not only is the commentary inconsistent with recent Su-
preme Court decisions, it is also inconsistent and incompatible with the concrete
language of the statute that was enacted by Congress. See United States v. McGill,
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coupled with indicated or implied use of the weapon.161  Such an amend-
ment would provide stability among the Federal circuit courts, be consis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent, and be analogous to the statutory
requirement for a controlled substance offense.162
B. Judicial Limitation of the Commentary: Avoiding Further Chaos in Residual
Clause Interpretation
If the current commentary remains authoritative when considering
what offenses qualify as crimes of violence, it is imperative that courts limit
its reach by considering sentencing enhancement for possession offenses
only if the weapon is a dangerous firearm enumerated in Section
5845(a).163  Nothing in the commentary or the Sentencing Guidelines in-
dicates that courts should consider the circumstances surrounding the
possession of the weapon and doing so has led to inconsistent results.164
618 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Congress included only the use, but not the
possession of, explosives among the ACCA’s example crimes.”).
161. See United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1990) (reasoning
offense requires some overt act in addition to possession when defendant is carry-
ing concealed weapon or is felon in possession of firearm in order to constitute
crime of violence); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding possession of firearm without firing it is not crime of violence), superseded
by statute on other grounds, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 433 (2003),
as recognized in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); United States v.
Thompson, 891 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding possession of firearm and
pointing it at suspect is crime of violence); see also United States v. Alvarez, 914
F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that although danger in possession of weap-
ons exists, it is “quite a stretch” to imply that simple possession equates to use or
threatened use of that weapon), superseded by statute on other grounds, U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 433 (2003), as recognized in Stinson v. United
States 508 U.S. 36 (2011). But see United States v. Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255,
262–63 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding mere possession of firearm is crime of violence).
162. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (acknowledging non-active and non-aggres-
sive offenses are “a far cry” from enumerated offenses exemplified in statute).  Re-
quiring possession offenses to be coupled with a form of intent or intended use
would be more consistent with Chambers, consistent with the common law notion
that possession alone cannot constitute a crime of violence, and would create a
universal framework for analyzing residual clause cases that would achieve greater
consistencies among circuit courts. See id.  Furthermore, the guidelines treat ille-
gal substance offenses in the same way. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2 (2012) (defining “controlled substance offense” in pertinent part as “pos-
session of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manu-
facture, import, export, distribute, or dispense”).  For a further discussion on how
“controlled substance offense” requires an additional overt act accompanying pos-
session, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of the importance of limiting the residual clause com-
mentary, particularly the section designating possession of a Section 5845(a) fire-
arm as a crime of violence, see infra notes 163–72 and accompanying text.
164. See United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (10th Cir.
2011) (examining circumstances surrounding possession of weapon in prison is
different because they are “‘inherently dangerous places and they present unique
problems’” (quoting United States v. Vahovick, 160 F.3d 395, 397 (7th  Cir.
1998))). But see United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining
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The commentary directs courts that possessing certain “firearms” amounts
to a crime of violence because the nature of the weapon suggests it could
not be possessed for any legitimate or lawful purposes.165  This reasoning,
however, was only meant to justify the result; it does not necessarily follow
that possession of a weapon or object that has “no legitimate use” under
certain circumstances should be classified as a crime of violence.166
For example, courts have categorically held that carrying a concealed
weapon is not a crime of violence even though there seems to be no lawful
or legitimate purpose for possessing a handgun at a bar.167  Possession of
a firearm in those circumstances could not conceivably be used for recrea-
tional purposes and could only be used to attack or deter attacks.168  Thus,
possession of shank in prison presents dangers but that does not, alone, “transform
a mere possession offense into one that is similar to the crimes listed”).  Courts
have properly refrained from considering the circumstances surrounding posses-
sion of an unlawful weapon in any other context. See United States v. Vincent, 575
F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining sawed-off shotguns are capable of in-
flicting “indiscriminate carnage[,]” regardless of circumstances); United States v.
Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798–99 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing inherent dangerous
nature of pipe bombs).
165. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. 1 (2012) (explain-
ing “[u]nlawfully possessing a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (e.g., a
sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun) is a ‘crime of
violence’”).  Courts applying the commentary’s directive have further reasoned
that Section 5845(a) firearms are inherently dangerous weapons that have no legit-
imate or lawful use under any circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Golding,
332 F.3d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that weapons such as bombs, ma-
chine guns, short-barreled shotguns and rifles “ ‘are primarily weapons of war and
have no appropriate sporting use or use for personal protection’” (quoting Jen-
nings, 195 F.3d at 799 n.4)).
166. See Polk, 577 F.3d at 520 (reasoning that circumstances surrounding pos-
session do not “transform” possession offense into violent, active, and aggressive
crime exemplified in statute).  The circumstances surrounding the possession of-
fense also do not transform the object possessed into an inherently dangerous
“‘weapon[ ] of war.’” See Golding, 332 F.3d at 842 (quoting Jennings, 195 F.3d at
799 n.4) (describing firearms under Section 5845(a)); see also United States v.
Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting) (noting shanks
are not included under Section 5845(a), but are also “entirely dissimilar to the
weapons that are included”).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 477 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that carrying concealed weapon does not amount to crime of violence under
residual clause); see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 47 (1993) (holding
that amended commentary stating that unlawful possession of firearm by felon is
not crime of violence was binding on courts interpreting residual clause).  Despite
the seemingly consistent understanding that mere possession of a standard
weapon or object is not an offense that rises to the level of a crime of violence, the
reasoning in Mobley clouds that principle because there are some circumstances
where possession would be “quasi-suspect” and have no “legitimate purpose.” See
Clayton E. Cramer, Violence Policy Center’s Concealed Carry Killers: Less Than It
Appears 19 (June 28, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095754 (ex-
plaining that carrying concealed handgun at bar while intoxicated is already crimi-
nal offense under North Carolina law).
168. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631 (reasoning that possessing prohibited object
in prison has no lawful use because “the only reason to carry such a weapon [while
in prison] is to use it to attack another or to deter an attack” (quoting Perez-Jiminez,
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following the reasoning in Mobley may lead courts to consider enhancing
simple possession offenses outside of prison if the weapon had no legiti-
mate purpose at the time it was being possessed.169
Extending the reach of the residual clause by considering the specific
circumstances surrounding possession not only strains the categorical ap-
proach established in Taylor, but also opens the flood gates to include pos-
session offenses involving ordinary weapons or objects as crimes of
violence.170 Mobley expands the residual clause beyond statutory intent
and Supreme Court precedent, thereby creating further inconsistencies
and confusion.171  The likelihood of achieving consistent residual clause
interpretations hinges on the willingness of courts to limit the reach of the
commentary when considering possession offenses to those weapons ex-
plicitly enumerated as dangerous firearms, or better yet, to hold that the
commentary is inconsistent with the statute in light of recent Supreme
Court precedent, the rule of lenity, and appropriate statutory
interpretation.172
654 F.3d at 1143)).  Even if this were the case, prisoners still retain their constitu-
tional right to self-defense.  For a discussion of prisoners’ right to self-defense, see
supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
169. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (“The mere fact that an
act is categorically unlawful does not necessarily render it a ‘dangerous and pro-
vocative act’ that . . . endangers others.” (quoting Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2267, 2273 (2011))).  For example, “failure to report to one’s penal confinement
cannot be accomplished in any lawful manner; but the Supreme Court neverthe-
less declared it to be non-violent.” Id.  Implementing Mobley’s reasoning would
distort consistent case law where possession of the weapon served no legitimate or
lawful purpose at the time it was possessed.  For a further discussion of how
Mobley’s reasoning contradicts case law, see supra notes 116–27, 165–69 and accom-
panying text.
170. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (directing courts to
consider risk posed by ordinary commission of offense and not to consider circum-
stances surrounding offense).  For a full discussion of the categorical approach
announced in Taylor, see supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
171. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (holding passive, inactive, offenses do not
pose similar risks to others and are not classified as crimes of violence); Jenny W.L.
Osborne, Note, One Day Criminal Careers: The Armed Career Criminal Act’s Different
Occasions Provision, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 973 (2011) (suggesting that apply-
ing sentencing enhancement for mere possession of firearms “strays from the orig-
inal idea of targeting offenders who repeatedly use firearms during the commission
of a robbery or burglary” (emphasis added)).
172. For a discussion of why the commentary is inconsistent with the princi-
ples of statutory interpretation and Supreme Court precedent, see supra notes
156–62 and accompanying text.  Courts facing the challenge of applying the
residual clause to possession offenses in the future should apply the rule of lenity,
due to the prior inconsistent interpretations and vague congressional drafting.
For a further discussion of why courts should apply the rule of lenity, see supra
notes 122–25 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of why it is imperative that
courts disregard the circumstances surrounding the possession of the weapon, as
the court failed to do in Mobley, see supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.
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